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Public activism of the war period: structure, forms and possibilities

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Abstract

The aim of the study is to conceptualise the wartime activism and to determine its place in the system of public activism. Wartime activism is analysed on the example of Russia's open armed aggression against Ukraine in 2022. The investigation is based on event-analysis, as well as field research that was conducted under wartime conditions. From the perspective of the theory and tradition of public activism, the expediency of distinguishing in the public activism system of such a type as wartime activism is argued. Its specific tasks, mechanisms of their implementation, risks, etc. are identified. Wartime activism is defined as a network of citizens' initiatives, their interactions (ones with military units, governmental and non-governmental institutions, interpersonal interactions, etc.) to counter the aggressor, save the lives and health of citizens, infrastructure, etc. This type of activism is positioned as the one that arises solely as a response of the democratic community to armed aggression and is realised in wartime. All the characteristics of wartime activism are presented as those caused by the peculiarities of wartime. It is emphasised that wartime activism: (1) is territorially limited to the borders of the state against which armed aggression was committed, and outside these borders acquires the format of anti-war activism; (2) is implemented in both real and virtual dimensions; (3) has the potential to unite the democratic community on a global scale. The structural model of wartime public activism is presented as a combination of three subsystems: frontline, rear area and foreign, each subsystem combining public activism in online and offline formats.

Keywords: public activism, wartime activism, war, Ukraine, Russian aggression.

1. Introduction

The war is by no means a social performance, but a tangle of lost lives, injuries, broken families, destroyed infrastructure, loss of everything earned, collapse of dreams, plans, physical and mental health. Ukraine and its peaceful citizens from 24 February 2022 were involuntarily drawn into the orbit of war. These events managed to stir up the whole world – both democratic and new authoritarian, demonstrating the true standards of each actor in the world politics.

The response to war is primarily the actions of the state, but reinforced by civil society and personal courage of many citizens. These responses may be different: someone defends a country with lethal weapons, someone is a volunteer in the rear, someone is a hacktivist fighter on the cyber front, someone with a word, a brush or graffiti visualises the problem.

Despite all the horrors of the war, the incredible courage of the Ukrainian military, the present paper focuses on the indomitable spirit of the Ukrainians and their creativity in the struggle for their independence and European values. The Ukrainians already demonstrated their ingenuity, creative spirit and thirst for life during the Revolution on Granite (1990), the Orange Revolution (2004-2005) and, especially, the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014). Then the photos and videos of musical improvisations on the yellow and blue piano (performance), the collective singing of the national anthem by about 500,000 people on New Year's Eve 2014 (happening), the construction of the main Christmas tree of Ukraine, which became evidence of the resistance of the Ukrainians (political art-installation), etc. went round the world. Much was written about the creative forms of protest of the Ukrainians at that time (Khoma 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Kozak 2017; Khoma, Kozma, 2022).

In fact, before the war of 2022, the actionist format of the protest fitted very well into the strategy of soft power, non-violent resistance, it also created an information pretext, launched an extensive discussion of the problem. This formed the image of a peaceful Ukraine in the international arena, when only the need to respond to aggression forces the Ukrainians to take up arms. Russia's violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine in February 2022 led not only to full mobilisation at the state level, but also to maximum consolidation at the societal lev-

el, and the emergence of diverse new forms of social interaction. These processes need to be studied in order to understand the nature, features and opportunities of public activism in the situations of war.

The aim of the study is to conceptualise wartime activism and determine its place in the system of public activism. This aim is achieved by analysing wartime activism on the example of Russia's war against Ukraine in 2022.

The issue of wartime activism in the system of public activism was hardly considered in social sciences. There is an explanation for this. Firstly, in modern democratic states, armed clashes have not yet occurred on such a scale as Russia's 2022 war against Ukraine. Therefore, there was no empirical material that would be the basis for the study of public activism at the time of open armed confrontation in a democratic state. Secondly, today internet communication is so highly advanced that, even during the war, countless public initiatives and mutual assistance based on trust become possible. Thirdly, over the three decades of independence, a democratic civil society has been formed in Ukraine, stable horizontal networks created, a rather considerable social capital accumulated, the majority of the public is committed to models of democratic political culture, there is a clear orientation towards European values and the networks of horizontal ties and the ability to quickly create new communication networks, channels, etc. are developed. They became the driving force of Ukrainians' resistance to the Russian aggressor. These factors make the Ukrainian case unique for the study of wartime activism.

2. Methodology

The present research is based on the theory and tradition of public activism. They conceptualise different types of activism – from the classic ones, which have a long history, to the latest, e.g. activism in social media (Baldwin 2018), cyber activism (Sandoval-Almazan, Gil-Garcia, 2014), hacktivism (Richards, Wood, 2018), etc. The study involves the methodological approaches of social movement theory, the collective action theory (Simon 1957; Olson 1965; Axelrod 1984, 1997; Macy 1991; Ostrom 1998, 2000; Reuben 2003; Czech 2016). The current integration of online and offline activism is taken into consideration (Greijdanus et al., 2020).

P. Oliver and G. Marwell (1992: 251) define social activists as "people who care enough about some issue that they are prepared to incur significant costs and act to achieve their goals". "Most of the authors are referring to social participation, mobilisation, social movements when they are speaking about social activism" (Dumitraşcu 2015: 86). This article considers public activism as a system of actions (both organised and spontaneous) that are aimed at achieving a certain socially significant result, social change through collective efforts.

In today's world, public activism has a broad focus – the environment, anti-corruption, sports, human rights, assistance to refugees, etc. The range of directions of public activism and its scale depend on the level of democracy of a state, dominant values in a given society and samples of political culture. The activism that manifests itself under open armed aggression can be positioned as a separate element of the system of public activism – wartime activism – in view of its special tasks, implementation mechanisms, risks, etc.

The study is based primarily on event-analysis, which collected and analysed a large amount of data on public activism in the first weeks of Ukrainian resistance to the Russian aggressor. As the author was a direct eyewitness of and participant in the events related to Russia's military aggression, she conducted a participant observation of the actions of public activists and interacted with them in various formats. Within the framework of such field research, the peculiarities of public activism in wartime conditions were clarified and the key directions of activity within this type of activism were identified. Also, in order to assess public activism in wartime, the content of numerous groups on social networks and messengers was monitored and critically evaluated.

3. Wartime public activism: content and structure

It is obvious that the structure and characteristics of public activism under violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity by the aggressor state differ significantly from the activism during the most acute moments of the Ukrainian history – the Revolution of Dignity, annexation of Crimea and the proclamation of unrecognised republics in Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. The peculiarity of this

activism is primarily in the increase of risks to life, health, etc. associated with certain actions. Most of these public actions occur next to the enemy rather than in the quiet rear.

On the one hand, in the structure of public activism there are large-scale volunteer initiatives that have legal registration, powerful information support, numerous human resources, certain reputation capital, etc. On the other hand, public activism during the war includes millions of actions and interactions of citizens that operate outside organised communities, being spontaneous and situational initiatives of the people. In other words, one can distinguish between public activism which organised, structured and large-scale, with certain history of functioning, on the one hand, and public activism which is spontaneous and situational, on the other. In both types of wartime public activism, patriotic, humanistic motives are obvious. They are the ones that activate citizens in choosing a model of behaviour that involves unpaid activities for a certain socially important result. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the war also provokes various formats of dishonest, criminal behaviour. This applies to various frauds under the guise of supposedly public initiatives. They are usually related to raising funds for the needs of the army, victims, etc.

The case of Ukraine in 2022 is likely to become the basis for expanding the theory of public activism, in view of the emergence of numerous new formats of action. Many of them would be unacceptable in peacetime. However, external aggression requires new formats of activism – often spontaneous, sometimes radical, self-organised, with risks to life and health. In fact, the present analysis not only indicates the possibilities of a well-organised volunteer movement, but also draws attention to the grassroots level of public initiatives.

Wartime activism is an extremely dynamic, rapidly changing network of various public initiatives, interactions between citizens, as well as with military units, governmental and non-governmental institutions, other actors for the purpose of countering the aggressor, saving lives and health, infrastructure, etc. Wartime activism can be positioned as an element of the system of public activism that emerges in response to armed aggression.

All the characteristics of this type of activism are conditioned by the peculiarities and needs of wartime. Due to the nature of the events that give rise to this type of activism, it occurs very rapidly and has a certain length of time (period of wartime declared by the authorities), must take into account various restrictions (e.g. curfew and mine risk). This distinguishes it from other types of activism, which are usually focused on a long-term format in peacetime. Wartime activism is limited to the territory in which martial law is imposed, and outside it acquires the format of anti-war activism.

Wartime activism combines various formats of online and offline activism. The structural model of wartime public activism is a synthesis of three subsystems: frontline, rear area and foreign. Each subsystem combines public activism in online and offline formats. A feature of wartime activism is its prospect of reformatting into post-war activism aimed at post-war reconstruction of the country and other tasks.

From the beginning of Russia's armed aggression, the Ukrainian public was most actively involved in the following forms of public activism: volunteering in support of the army; financial assistance, especially to the army; health care facilities; countering the misinformation; assistance to internally displaced persons (housing, clothing, basic necessities, medicines, transportation, etc.). This is only the upper level in the system of public activism in wartime.

Frontline activism involves a variety of actions of the residents, business, non-governmental organisations, the church and other actors for the purposes of national resistance in the area where hostilities occur. They can be grouped by areas: (1) various forms of support by the civilians of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; (2) the entry of civilians into the Territorial Defence Forces, volunteer units; (3) the opposition to the enemy (disinformation, destruction or seizure of weapons, blocking of roads for the passage of equipment, organising mass peaceful protests against the occupiers, etc.); (4) the assistance in the evacuation of civilians through open humanitarian corridors; (5) the delivery of humanitarian goods and transportation of the wounded; (6) the search for missing or lost children and adults with whom contact is lost and single elderly people; (7) the rescue of stray animals, etc. This activism is dangerous to life and health due to the terrorist behaviour of the Russian army, mined roads and

buildings, as well as abductions, arrests, torture and executions of both Ukrainians and foreigners. It is necessary to notice that when all initiatives of various state and non-state actors did not work, the representatives of the clergy of different denominations undertook to perform certain tasks. A vivid example was besieged Mariupol, where for many days they tried to deliver humanitarian cargo with the involvement of priests.

Internet communication channels play an important role in the implementation of some public initiatives, through which, for example, it is possible to find vehicles for evacuation, help people with disabilities to leave the war zone, deliver food to those who cannot leave their homes for various reasons, release pets, help with medication, etc.

Rear area activism includes diverse actions of civil society actors, which can be grouped into the following areas: (1) logistical support for the army, volunteer battalions (food, medicine, helmets, bullet-proof vests, optoelectronic devices, military clothing, etc.); (2) humanitarian, informational and other support for internally displaced persons; (3) work on the information front: countering misinformation, sending complaints with demands to block the groups on social networks and messengers with destructive content, etc.; (4) transportation of humanitarian goods from abroad and their transfer to the destination; (5) assistance in the evacuation of civilians from the war zone, accommodation of internally displaced persons; (6) coordination of flows of internally displaced persons to different border crossings depending on their current congestion; (7) signing petitions, open letters and other formats of communication activism; (8) medical and psychological counselling, psychological assistance to those who remain in the war zone (by means of online communication), internally displaced persons; (9) assistance while waiting at checkpoints on the western border of Ukraine (deployment of warming centres, food services areas, etc.); (10) rescue of abandoned pets. This list of civic initiatives is not exhaustive, as it includes many different actions initiated by civil society actors.

Notably, within the rear area direction of activism, local business appeared to be clearly socially responsible. The first weeks of the war demonstrated that Ukrainian business finally moved away from the paradigm of economic rationality (the de-

sire to obtain the greatest economic result with minimal expenditure of necessary resources) to corporate social responsibility.

The full coordination of the actions of Ukrainian civil society with the institutions of the state during the war must be emphasised. As soon as civil society signalled a problem with the implementation of the tasks undertaken, state institutions responded immediately. For example, the simplification of the rules for the import of humanitarian aid to Ukraine, the elimination of checkpoints that significantly complicated the transportation of humanitarian goods, the introduction of a simplified procedure for customs clearance of goods in wartime, etc. Conversely, when state institutions asked for help on a particular issue, activists responded promptly.

Foreign activism includes a wide range of actions of Ukrainian civil society, which are aimed at interaction with the public from abroad, representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora. These interactions concerned: (1) a request to form an impartial opinion about Russian aggression in Ukraine, to disseminate information about the actions of the Russian army; (2) ensuring the humanitarian needs of the Ukrainian army and internally displaced persons, transferring humanitarian aid from abroad to Ukraine; (3) attracting broad public diplomacy opportunities to put pressure on the governments of democratic states to increase their support for Ukraine, pressure on international corporations to exit the Russian market; (4) translations in foreign languages information about events in Ukraine for the dissemination of credible information on social media and by means of other channels; (5) accommodation of those citizens of Ukraine who applied for temporary protection and/or assistance in their employment. These are only a few areas of wartime public activism in the segment of international cooperation.

4. The main directions of organised wartime public activism

Several areas of organised public activity of the Ukrainian community during the war can be distinguished. Importantly, the formats of wartime public activism to be named later are only part of a wide spectrum of actions and initiatives. With each day of the war, the range of areas of public activism increased, and the tasks changed, according to the needs of the moment. That is, public activism during the

war is characterised by rapid dynamics, i.e. quick responses to new challenges caused by external aggression.

The first group of actions concerns numerous initiatives of volunteer organisations. Public structures that support the army and internally displaced persons have been operating in Ukraine for almost a decade. Therefore, the experience of organising such assistance by Ukrainian volunteers is considerable. Volunteer initiatives caused by the war can be grouped according to the needs: food, military needs, medical care, clothing, freight and passenger transportation, translators, psychological assistance, etc. During the war, various platforms were created (e.g., https://v-tylu.work/, https://volonter.org/, https://t.me/people4ua, etc.), on which everyone could offer themselves as a volunteer in a certain direction or ask for help about something. Volunteer organisations declared a narrow focus (assistance to people with disabilities, internally displaced persons, abandoned animals, etc.), specific areas of activity (transportation of humanitarian aid or people from the war zone, cooking for the front or internally displaced persons, search for missing people, etc.). Undoubtedly, the volunteer movement is the most organised, effective segment of public activism in wartime and Russia's military aggression has resulted in the creation of the largest international volunteer network in modern history.

The second group of actions concerns cyber-activism or digital activism. The role of activists in this field is extremely important, as the current wars are waged not only in geographical spaces, but also in cyberspace. The key role here is played by IT specialists and companies. They help repel DDoS attacks on the banking sector, official websites of the Ukrainian authorities, etc., and organise cyber attacks on the infrastructure of the public sector of the Russian Federation. However, even the skills of the average user are enough for digital activism, e.g. blocking pages on social networks with anti-Ukrainian content, preventing the spread of fakes, and so on. Thanks to social networks and messengers, the whole IT army of Ukraine was created, which performs many tasks: development of special software, creation of specialised chatbots, etc. These processes received state support, including the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine.

The third group of actions concerns the fighters of the information front. The main, but not the only, platforms for information activism are social networks. Nowadays, bloggers, influencers, especially those with multi-million audiences, are really able to shape public opinion. The fighters of the information front face many tasks: copywriting, social media marketing (SMM), fact checking, sharing, gathering information, blocking propaganda resources, etc.

An important area of activity for information front activists is the preparation of high-quality English-language content to inform citizens of other countries about the situation in Ukraine. Examples are We Are Ukraine (https://www.weare ukraine.info/), Post to Stop War in Ukraine (https://post-to-stop-war.in.ua/) and others. The need for such public initiatives is due to the fact that Ukraine does not have a strong system of broadcasting to foreign audiences in foreign languages. Such channels of communication are aimed at voicing Ukraine's messages, spreading appeals to the public of other countries to increase pressure on their governments to support Ukraine, admit it to the EU, strengthen sanctions against Russia and the like. No less important, but very difficult to implement is the transmission of information to Russian audiences. This work is complicated by information aggression, including hate speech on the part of Russian users of social networks. This was especially noticeable in the first weeks of the war, when all popular social networks were available to users from Russia.

The fourth group of actions concerns the involvement of local inhabitants in the protection of public order in settlements and on roads. Initiated by the authorities or unauthorised, checkpoints were built by activists from all sorts of materials. The joint efforts of the police, territorial defence volunteers and the public were aimed at counteracting the passage of Russian military equipment and the penetration of sabotage groups. Numerous checkpoints were set up by the public. However, the activity of the Ukrainians in setting up unauthorised checkpoints a few days after the beginning of the war proved ineffective, as they hindered the movement of emergency services and humanitarian goods. Consequently, various volunteer community groups were involved in the arrangement of checkpoints together with district military administrations. For instance, in the first days of the Russian aggression, 544 checkpoints

were constructed in Lviv region, but in two weeks their number was reduced to 100. The rest of the checkpoints were turned into observation posts, supported by local communities.

At the urging of local authorities, residents were involved in round-the-clock patrols. All those who wished to patrol were registered with the nearest state administrations and included in patrol groups to assist the police and territorial defence forces. This experience is not new for the Ukrainians, as after the bloody events during the Revolution of Dignity (the night of 19 February 2014) there was a "Night of Wrath" (destruction of office buildings in Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, etc.). At that time, many volunteers participated in the processes of ensuring the security of cities and preventing looting. In 2022, the main focus of such patrols was on identifying saboteurs and eliminating the consequences of their sabotage.

Also, at the initiative of the State Agency of Automobile Roads of Ukraine, citizens and territorial communities engaged in the dismantling of road signs, plaques with the names of administrative premises or other objects, which indicated the name of the settlement. All signs were handed over to local authorities for safekeeping. That was done to disorient Russian troops, who had poor communications and difficulties in navigating the terrain. Instead, the local communities contributed to the placement of new signs aimed not at the regulation of traffic, but at the psychological impact on the Russian military: "The occupiers are not allowed to move", "Surrender right now or meet death", and others.

As can be seen, the Ukrainian public worked closely with state institutions to counter Russian aggression. The conditions of the war contributed to strong cooperation between the state and public sectors. If in peacetime, there are traditional debates between the state and civil society, large or small confrontations, then the war determined other algorithms of interaction.

The fifth group of actions is the classic formats of public activism (meeting, demonstration, picket, march, etc.). It should be noted that the legal regime of wartime prohibits such mass events. It is difficult to conduct them during the war due to the high risk to the life and health of the organisers and participants. However, even under the threat of physical destruction by the Russian military, Ukrainian citizens

staged pro-Ukrainian protests. Importantly, mass protests of civilians with Ukrainian symbols took place at the time when cities were under the control of Russian troops. A substantial number of such mass events occurred in the southern war-struck regions of Ukraine: Zaporizhzhia (Enerhodar, Melitopol, Tokmak, Berdiansk, etc.), Luhansk (Starobilsk), Donetsk (Kramatorsk, Mariupol), Kherson (Henichesk, Nova Kakhovka, Skadovsk, Kherson, etc.). In the course of many such peaceful actions, with the demand for the Russian troops to retreat, the Russian military used weapons, with human casualties. In particular, in Nova Kakhovka, Melitopol, Chaplynka and other settlements of Ukraine, the Russian military opened fire on peaceful protesters. It is indicative that peaceful protests in captured cities in southern Ukraine were not ceased even after the beginning of arrests, threats of execution for participating in peaceful protests under Ukrainian flags, as well as the abduction of government officials, local governments, protest coordinators, local activists, human rights activists and priests.

Moreover, the people of many Ukrainian settlements came out in an organised manner to meet Russian equipment with demands not to let it in. In some places it was effective. Examples were recorded of how Russian troops retreated under pressure from unarmed citizens who did not allow them to enter their settlement.

The same forms of peaceful protest positioned as actionism (e.g. performances, happenings, art installations, flash mobs, etc.) are actively conducted against the background of Russia's aggression, but outside Ukraine. In most democratic countries, diverse forms of protests in support of Ukraine took place. Requirements varied depending on the situation. In the early days of the war, peaceful protesters appealed to governments to provide military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, block Russia's access to SWIFT, tighten sanctions against individual citizens of the Russian Federation, and the like. Most of the messages concerned the request to "close the sky", i.e. to cover Ukraine with NATO's Integrated Air Defence System. Many anti-war protests outside Ukraine were organised thanks to the Ukrainian diaspora around the world. Only in Russia and Belarus the participants of such actions were brought to justice.

The sixth group of actions concerns public initiatives aimed at saving the lives and health of the military and civilians during the war. First of all, blood donation should be emphasised here. In addition, by efforts of medical facilities, medical educational institutions many trainings were organised on the provision of medical care, and here activism from two sides can be observed: some wanted to teach, and others wanted to learn. This refers to numerous initiatives related to the collection and targeted transfer of medicines for the needs of the military and civilians, the evacuation of seriously ill patients outside Ukraine. One cannot fail to mention the provision by many private medical institutions of free services, including doctors' online consultations. In the war zone, even complex operations were carried out with the remote involvement of specialists via video communication, and babies were also delivered.

The seventh group of actions concerns the sphere of culture and spiritual life. For instance, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine involved the general public in gathering information about the damage caused by Russian aggressors to cultural heritage sites in Ukraine. Thanks to concerned citizens, the facts of destruction of archaeological sites, ancient buildings, historical cemeteries, monuments, religious buildings, works of art, natural monuments, buildings of cultural institutions, etc. were recorded. Owing to the public, cases of robbery of museums, libraries, etc. by the Russian military were systematised. Verified information is due to be passed to the International Criminal Court in the Hague for investigation.

One of the brightest cases was the rescue of works by the world-famous Ukrainian artist M. Prymachenko with the help of the public. During the offensive, the Russian army burned down the local history museum in the village of Ivankiv, Kyiv region, where some of the artist's works were held. It was the local community that managed to save a large number of museum exhibits.

Also in the ancient cities of Ukraine, some of which are UNESCO World Heritage Sites, as well as in the places where in museum funds valuable exhibits are stored, the public, authorities an local businesses made great efforts to prevent their destruction during possible bombardments. For example, in Lviv, open-air objects were wrapped in fireproof and protective materials. Stained glass windows were closed with protective screens. Unique sculptures, in particular of a sacred nature,

were dismantled and moved to the dungeons. Such delicate work with UNESCO World Heritage Sites is conducted not by the public but by restoration professionals, but during the war human, financial, technical and other resources were accumulated for this at the level of society and non-governmental organisations (e.g. the Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments).

An important part of public activism was the gatherings of representatives of culture and spiritual life around common problems that were not only acute during the war, but are likely to be relevant for a long time after the end of Russian aggression. As an illustration, on the initiative of the Municipal Museum in Lviv "Territory of Terror", the Museum Crisis Fund "Emergency Museum Aid" was organised. Its task was to provide financial support to museums, especially in small towns and villages in eastern and southern Ukraine, which were at the epicentre of Russian aggression. During the acute phase of the war, the assistance was related to meeting the basic needs (food, medicine) of the workers of these museums, who survived and preserved the local heritage. Further support formats are aimed at post-war reconstruction.

The eighth group of actions concerns the field of science and education. In the first days of the war, Ukrainian scientists turned to Clarivate and Elsevier, which own the abstract, bibliographic databases Scopus and Web of Science, to suspend cooperating with Russia, deprive Russian institutions of access to these databases, and cease indexing Russian publications. The Ukrainian scientific and pedagogical community was actively involved in lobbying to limit Russia's participation in all EU instruments for scientific and innovation cooperation.

Ukrainian researchers appealed to foreign institutions and research foundations to reconsider their policy of cooperation in education and science with Russia and those countries that supported the armed aggression against Ukraine. Ukrainian educational institutions and research institutes also signed letters to Russian scientists and educators, but the response was reduced to the Address of the Russian Union of Rectors with full support for any of V. Putin's actions.

Ukrainian scientists united around the idea of limiting Russia's participation in all EU instruments for scientific and innovation cooperation (Horizon Europe, In-

terreg Europe, Eureka, etc.). The community of Ukrainian scientists also initiated the issue of excluding the Russian Federation from a number of international organisations (Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission UNESCO, Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, International Centre for Black Sea Studies, etc.). Additionally, the Ukrainian scientific and pedagogical community actively lobbied for a boycott of international scientific events in the Russian Federation, suspending the participation of Russian scientists, students and educational institutions in international academic mobility programmes. Generally, the scientific and pedagogical community during the war was strongly united and clearly articulated their demands and requests.

Besides, the Ukrainian pedagogical community actively supported internally displaced persons and collected aid for the army. From the first day of the war, various educational centres, headquarters, centres for the collection of humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons, the army, etc. began to operate in many educational institutions. Separate buildings of educational institutions and gyms received internally displaced persons.

It must be noted that within the framework of this article it is hardly possible to present the whole spectrum of areas of public activity, only those that were most clearly manifested in the first weeks of Russia's military aggression in Ukraine are therefore indicated.

5. The main directions of spontaneous wartime public activism

Public activism of the Ukrainians during the war was not only organised but also spontaneous. Its implementation was dictated by the situation, i.e. the requirement of a specific time in a specific place. Several types of spontaneous activism can be singled out.

The *first group* of actions concerns the seizure of Russian military equipment by unarmed civilians at risk to their lives and the capture of the soldiers of the occupying army. Some of the plots seem surreal. Here are several examples of the first days of the war:

- in Kyiv, two ordinary "guys from Obolon" seized an armoured personnel carrier that stopped, pulled out the Russian servicemen, waited for the representatives of the Ukrainian armed forces and handed over the invaders to them;

- at the Sumy-Tovarna railway station, two workers misinformed the Russian servicemen and diverted their armoured personnel carrier to a dead-end siding; this became a trap for the occupiers;

- in the village of Liubymivka, Kherson region, a coalition of Roma and local peasants dismantled the tank to an inoperative condition, and then the Roma stole an infantry fighting vehicle with the help of an ordinary tractor;

- in the village of Stanova, Sumy region, while the Russian servicemen were robbing a local grocery store, peasants stole their fuel truck.

These are only some examples of the desperate local resistance of the unarmed Ukrainians who accumulated all their ingenuity to defend their land. Such actions increase the technical and human losses which were inflicted by the Ukrainian army. The activism, which in peacetime would be seen as a crime, finds tremendous public support in wartime (especially through social media) and gratitude at various levels.

The *second group* of actions concerns the public response to cases of looting. The instant reaction was the punishment of those who in wartime impinged on the property of the wounded, the killed, the premises that were destroyed or unguarded. During the war, eyewitnesses became investigators, judges and executors of the people's verdict. Surely, in Ukraine there are criminal procedural mechanisms for punishing looters; they were even strengthened after the beginning of the war (3 to 10 years in prison), but the recording of such cases, most often in wartime, immediately escalated into a vigilantism that received the approval of both the people and the informal approval of the authorities.

Actually, from the first days of the war, the popular flash mob "Catch and Punish the Marauder" began to spread in Ukraine, because such express cases of vigilantism were recorded in many cities. The most popular form of punishment for looters during the Russian aggression of 2022 was to attach the trapped to the nearest pole. Such first best poles served as the medieval pillory for the public disgrace of the criminal. To enhance the social and educational effect (so to speak, preventive

measures), the marauder was stripped of his clothes, strapped, and so on. The punishment itself presupposed, first of all, public shame and disgrace.

The *third group* of actions concerns the capture or physical elimination of the Russian military. Here are the active civilians who, taking into account the scope of their professional activities or hobbies, own weapons. Examples are Ukrainian game wardens and hunters. From the first days of the war, with the support of the authorities and territorial defence force, game wardens, foresters, and hunters actually arranged "safaris" for the Russian military. These people are valuable for their knowledge of all the paths and ravines in a particular area where the enemy may hide. It is noteworthy that these groups of Ukrainian citizens were activated by the state, in particular by the Minister of Defence of Ukraine, O. Reznikov.

The fourth group of public actions concerns the production of self-made means of defence. First of all, it is referred to bottles with incendiary mixture for further disposal of Russian equipment. To make them, from the first minutes of the war the collection of glassware began. Homeless people were among the first to join, taking glassware out of garbage containers. Civilised collection of glass bottles, as well as fabrics, fuels and other components for the preparation of explosive mixtures was arranged very quickly. Notably, state institutions (e.g. the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine) through social networks and messengers actively instructed how to make flammable mixtures. In peacetime, something like this would seem a fantasy.

As Russian aggression grew, the ingenuity and creative energy of the Ukrainians had only an upward trend. As an illustration, instead of manually throwing Molotov cocktails, folk inventors proposed the design of a catapult that can throw inflamed bottles over a much greater distance. This is how the inventions of the ancient Greeks came in handy during the high-tech wars of the 21st century.

The public also constructed barricades from car tires to set them on fire as enemy approached, making it difficult for enemy vehicles to move. Many citizens, including business representatives joined in the collection of metal and the manufacture of various non-explosive barriers, especially anti-tank "hedgehogs" and "stars". Such metal structures are meant to stop or at least slow down the enemy's heavy military equipment. Students and teachers of vocational schools, as well as private en-

trepreneurs who made metal products before the war were involved in their manufacture. For most, it was a whole new social experience. The production of camouflage nets, which all age groups joined, also became widespread.

The fifth group of actions concerns the sphere of religious life, the interaction of religious organisations and believers in counteracting Russian aggression. First of all, it should be noted that in Ukraine, from the first days of the war, the Russian army had been shelling sacred buildings of all denominations. Many ancient and modern religious buildings were destroyed. In the event of the destruction of the buildings of religious organisations, first of all the clergy and the parishioners defended the objects of church use, preventing looting in damaged temples.

Since the days of the Revolution of Dignity, many religious communities actively engaged in the aid collection and numerous actions to support the Ukrainian statehood. Hence, during the war of 2022, they had networks of social contacts for cooperation in various areas: medical care and temporary shelter, front assistance, cooking, and so on. During the war, many sacred buildings became shelters from shelling and bombing. They turned into centres for the collection and distribution of things to internally displaced persons. The initiatives of religious organisations to help internally displaced persons during the evacuation, or while waiting to cross the state border are important. Religious communities organised meals for internally displaced persons, collected and redistributed basic necessities. The spectrum of activity of religious communities is presently very extensive. It is worth mentioning that the church has a long tradition to be an important link in social initiatives, especially in times of crisis (philosophy of social ministries).

The sixth group of actions concerns the support of pets, because not all owners, fleeing shelling, were able to take them out. A large number of domestic animals were found at train stations and along routes. Some of these animals were taken into the care of animal shelters. Such shelters arranged for the transfer of animals to new owners, and the community helped with food. In general, assistance to abandoned, lost pets became a separate area of social cohesion. Many online initiatives (Zoopatrul Kyiv, Save Pets of Ukraine, "Fauna Service", etc.), chat bots and groups on social networks were launched. In this way, information was collected, requests for

help from pet owners, breeders, zoo volunteers, citizens who found abandoned animals were processed.

A particular problem during the war was the zoos located in the war zone, both private and public. The role of caring citizens in supporting animals that were hostages of the war was great, at least with food and water. However, sincere intentions to help animals during the war also had tragic consequences, as in the Feldman Ecopark, Kharkiv region, where volunteers, who after appeals on social networks agreed to come to feed the animals, were shot dead. Still, in the intervals between shelling and bombing, citizens managed to take some of the animals out of various zoos and animal shelters.

Since zoos are not profitable in wartime, keeping animals became a real problem. The solution was to buy online tickets by caring citizens for conditional visits to the zoo. This special method of crowdfunding appeared to be a way to save animals. Such actions are also regarded as public activism.

The seventh group of actions concerns evacuation activism. It would be wrong to state that this is an exclusively spontaneous type of activism, as the state and volunteer organisations are actively involved in the evacuation. Concurrently, the evacuation process demonstrated a great unity of society in mutual assistance. First of all, social networks were used to search for those who could take an additional passenger. Through special services, some citizens could inform about a place in the car, while others could take advantage of such an offer. This is not about providing paid transport services, but about being willing to help fellow citizens. The evacuation direction was also realised through the assistance to reach the state border from relatively safe cities. Residents of Ukraine's border villages provided support to those who had been waiting for a long time to cross the border.

As in the case of the organised type of activism, only a small part of the areas of wartime public activism of the spontaneous type are indicated here. The cases mentioned give an idea of the architecture of wartime activism, they do not, however, exhaust its characteristic.

6. Conclusions

Wartime activism is a system of initiatives of citizens, their interactions (among themselves, with military units, governmental and non-governmental institutions an other entities) to counter the aggressor state, save the lives of citizens, preserve or restore infrastructure, etc. This type of activism is an element of the system of public activism that arises in response to armed aggression and is realised in wartime. All the characteristics of wartime activism are the result of a violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity of one country by another (aggressor), due to the realities of wartime. Wartime activism: (1) is not territorially limited by the borders of the state against which the armed aggression was carried out, but is spread outside in the format of anti-war activism; (2) is implemented in both real and virtual dimensions; (3) has the potential to unite the general public on an international scale.

The structural model of wartime public activism combines three subsystems: frontline, rear area and foreign. Each subsystem consists of public activism in online and offline formats and combines activism of the organised and spontaneous types. With the beginning of Russia's armed aggression, the Ukrainian public was most actively involved in the following forms of public activism: volunteering in support of the army; financial assistance, especially to the army, health care facilities; countering misinformation; assistance to internally displaced persons (accommodation, clothing, basic necessities, medicines, transportation and others), etc. This is only the upper level in the system of public activism in wartime.

The frontline subsystem of wartime activism includes numerous actions of the local citizens where hostilities take place, where mine laying is possible. Therefore, such activism is dangerous to the lives and health of activists. Activists assist government agencies in carrying out specific wartime tasks or undertake a particular segment of work: helping rescuers dismantle debris after bombings, transporting the wounded to hospitals, searching for the missing, assisting in the evacuation of civilians, helping with food, and the like.

The rear area subsystem of wartime activism includes a complex of diverse actions of the public. This activism poses less risk to the lives and health of activists than within the frontline subsystem. Activists complement the actions of state institu-

tions to provide logistical support to the army, hospitals, and internally displaced persons. They become "virtual fighters" of the information front, rescue animals, search for missing people, sign petitions, form public opinion, join the maintenance of law and order, etc.

The foreign subsystem of wartime activism provides for the interaction of the Ukrainian public with the public from abroad, representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora. These interactions concern: the formation of an objective opinion about Russian aggression in Ukraine; humanitarian needs of the Ukrainian army and civilians; attracting ample opportunities for public diplomacy to put pressure on the governments of democracies to increase support for Ukraine, pressure on international corporations to exit the Russian market.

Given the volume of the article, the analysis was limited to relatively few areas of public activism of the organised and spontaneous types, which were recorded in the first weeks of Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2022. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the system of wartime activism is much broader, which requires further study and conceptualisation. The Case of Ukraine in 2022 provides expansive empirical material for further conceptualisation of wartime public activism.

7. References

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